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The key question I seek to answer in this proposal is: 
 
  How do regulators and policy makers know when a large increase in leverage will end 
badly? 
 
A large body of evidence suggests that the sharp increase in household debt during the years 
prior to the Great Recession of 2007 to 2009 was perhaps the most important factor explaining 
the severity of the downturn.
2 Seeing this sharp increase in household debt during the housing 
boom was not difficult. Instead, the difficulty was determining whether regulators and policy 
makers should be concerned about the increase. 
 
My proposal seeks to answer the following question: how does a regulator know when a large 
increase in household debt will end badly? I argue that the answer to this question lies in the 
ability to detect whether an increase in household leverage is due to an expansion in the supply 
of credit or whether it is due to improvements in the productivity of borrowers. The essence of 
the strategy I propose is to use micro-economic data on borrowers with a high elasticity of 
borrowing with respect to credit availability to isolate the supply versus productivity effects. If a 
sharp increase in leverage is due primarily to an increase in the supply of credit, the regulator 
should be concerned. While I focus here on the household sector, the approach I describe could 
easily be applied to other sectors, such as non-financial corporations or banks. 
 
Three preliminary facts will help motivate the methodology. First, when fueled by an expansion 
in the availability of credit, dramatic increases in leverage typically end badly. Kindleberger 
(2005) conducts a careful historical analysis of financial crises and argues that they are often 
preceded by the "expansion of credit result[ing] from the development of substitutes for what 
previously had been traditional monies." My assertion is that serious dangers lurk when financial 
innovation leads to a sharp increase in debt levels that are unaccompanied by improvements in 
borrowers' permanent income or productivity.
3 
 
                                                  
1 I thank Atif Mian, Robert Vishny, and participants in the NBER Systemic Risk Initiative in April 2011 in Chicago. 
This note was prepared for the NBER Systemic Risk Initiative. An online appendix with the data description and 
figures is available at: 
2 See for example Mian and Sufi (2010, 2011), Glick and Lansing (2010), and Hall (2011). 
3 This is, of course, a controversial assertion. However, it is supported by evidence from a variety of sources, 
including Kindleberger and Aliber (2005), Eichengreen and Mitchener (2003), Mian and Sufi (2009), and Schularick 
and Taylor (2009). There is an indisputable strong predictive relation between sharp increases in debt and 
subsequent financial crises. I do not take a stand on the underlying model that is consistent with this relation. While 
I fully agree that more research on this issue is needed, I believe the evidence is strong enough to warrant careful 
monitoring of debt levels in the economy.  Second, there is a segment of the U.S. population that displays a very high elasticity of 
borrowing with respect to credit availability. This has been shown in a variety of contexts 
including credit cards (Gross and Souleles (2002), home equity loans (Mian and Sufi (2011)), 
and auto loans (Einav, Jenkins, and Levin (2011)). The aggressiveness shown by borrowers is 
notable: in my joint work with Atif Mian, we show that borrowers in the lowest quartile of the 
credit rating distribution borrow up to $0.75 for every $1.00 of increase in home equity. 
 
Third, asset prices are often a function of debt levels. There are both theoretical (e.g., Allen and 
Gale (2000), Geanokoplos (2010), Simsek (2011)) and empirical studies (Mian and Sufi (2009), 
Favara and Imbs (2010)) that support this view. As a result, debt to value ratios are often 
misleading in the midst of an expansion in debt. A critical mistake is to justify high levels of debt 
with an appeal to high asset values. If the expansion of debt is causing the increase in the value, 
the higher values will likely prove to be temporary. 
 
These three facts are important to keep in mind as I outline the methodology below. 
 
II. The Methodology 
 
The methodology I propose is as follows.
4 Conditional on seeing a sharp increase in leverage in 
some sector of the economy, use micro-economic data to implement the following three steps: 
 
1.  Determine who the marginal borrowers are that have a very high elasticity of borrowing 
with respect to credit availability. Ideally, one wants to classify marginal borrowers 
before the large increase in debt. These borrowers will often appear "constrained" from 
receiving credit before the increase in leverage. 
 
2.  Ask the question: during the period of increasing debt levels, has the flow of credit to 
these marginal borrowers increased substantially relative to non-marginal borrowers? Or 
in other words, are previously constrained borrowers responsible for a large fraction of 
the total increase in debt levels? In most circumstances where debt levels have increased 
sharply, the answer to this question will be yes. 
 
3.  If the answer to the above question is yes, ask the question: Is the relative increase in the 
flow of credit to marginal borrowers driven by productivity improvements/increases in 
permanent income? Use current income growth as a proxy. This is the key step in the 
methodology and requires the most careful analysis. 
 
If the answer to question 2 is yes and the answer to question 3 is no, then the evidence is 
supportive of credit supply as the driving force behind increases in debt levels. My assertion is 
that the regulator should show some concern if this is the case. 
 
I do not take a stand on the precise steps that the regulator should take at that point in time. It 
will depend on the circumstances and the overall economic environment. But it is critical for the 
regulator to understand when sharp increases in debt levels are likely driven by an expansion in 
                                                  
4 A simple model to motivate this test is in Mian and Sufi (2009). the willingness to lend by creditors, and not by improvements in productivity or permanent 
income. 
 
III. An Example: The 2002 to 2007 Increase in U.S. Household Debt 
 
Figure 1 in the online appendix shows the sharp rise in household debt in the U.S. beginning in 
about 2000.  While there was a general increase in household debt since the 1950s, the increase 
in debt from 2000 to 2007, measured either as a total or scaled by income, was stunning in 
historical perspective. Witnessing this this sharp rise in household debt in real time, the regulator 
would now be in a position to implement the methodology above. 
 
The first step is to isolate marginal borrowers. I examine two measures used in the previous 
literature (Gross and Souleles (2002), Mian and Sufi (2009)): the credit card utilization rate and 
the fraction of borrowers with a credit score under 660. I measure these variables at the zip code 
level as of 1998. In Figure 2 in the online appendix, I show the correlation of these two variables 
with denial rates on mortgage applications as of 1998. Both of these measures were strongly 
correlated with the denial rate, which is consistent with the view that these measures capture 
"constrained" or "marginal" households. 
 
For step 2, I measure the flow of credit to these marginal borrowers using new mortgage 
originations for house purchase. I split the sample of zip codes based on the fraction of 
individuals with a credit score below 660 as of 1992. In Figure 3 in the online appendix, I show 
the growth in mortgage originations for house purchase from 1992 through 2009. As Figure 3 
shows, there was a dramatic relative growth in originations for zip codes with a large fraction of 
marginal borrowers, as measured by credit score. This corresponded closely to the period in 
which aggregate household debt levels increased sharply. The answer to the question in step 2 is 
yes: the sharp increase in overall household debt corresponded to a dramatic relative increase in 
the flow of credit to marginal borrowers. 
 
For step 3, I measure relative income growth for marginal versus non-marginal borrowers. 
Figure 4 in the appendix shows income growth for high versus low credit quality zip codes. 
From 2002 to 2007--the period in which the relative growth in mortgage credit to low credit 
quality zip codes was strongest--there was no evidence that low credit quality zip codes 
experienced substantial gains in income. If anything, the opposite is true: marginal borrowers in 
the U.S. from 2002 to 2007 were experiencing a tremendous growth in mortgage credit while 
experiencing lower income growth relative to non-marginal borrowers. 
 
If the methodology above had been implemented during the 2000 to 2007 explosion in U.S. 
household debt, it would have been clear that the sharp increase was driven primarily by an 
expansion in the credit supply. This could have been seen as early as 2004 and very strongly in 
2005. 
 
IV. Additional Notes on Methodology 
 
  The methodology explicitly ignores asset prices. It compares the flow of credit to 
marginal households with their income growth, but does not take into account the increase in the value of the asset being financed (in the case of 2000 to 2007, house 
prices). The justification for ignoring asset prices is that they are often a function of debt 
availability. In the context of the 2000 to 2007 credit expansion, Figure 5 in the appendix 
shows that house prices increased by more in zip codes with a larger fraction of low 
credit quality borrowers. This relative growth in house prices occurred despite the fact 
that income growth in these areas was relatively negative. Indeed, perhaps the biggest 
mistake made by regulators in the household debt run-up was to justify debt levels with 
high house prices, when high debt levels were likely pushing up house prices. 
 
  The methodology also explicitly ignores interest payments on debt. Expansions in 
credit correspond with declines in interest rates, and so a comparison of income to 
interest rates ("debt service ratio") can hide the danger of higher debt levels. This was 
especially true from 2002 to 2007 when lower interest payments were driven in part by 
teaser rates on adjustable-rate mortgages that depended on continued house price growth. 
Further, it is likely that the level of debt will be the biggest problem in a financial crisis 
(given debt overhang or risk shifting tendencies), not the flow of interest payments to 
creditors. 
 
  This methodology is about aggregate patterns. A mistaken view is that this exercise 
only isolates patterns among marginal borrowers. Instead, the methodology uses marginal 
borrowers to make an assertion about what is driving aggregate economic patterns. If the 
flow of credit to marginal borrowers expands dramatically despite lower relative income 
growth, it is likely that the increase in debt levels even for non-marginal borrowers is 
driven by credit supply. In Appendix Figure 6, I present a scatter plot of U.S. states that 
supports this view. On the horizontal axis, I calculate for each state the zip code level 
correlation between low credit quality share and mortgage origination growth from 2002 
to 2006. States with a high score on this measure are states where the credit supply effect 
is strongest. On the vertical axis, I plot the total household debt growth over the same 
time period. As the figure shows, there is a very strong positive relation between overall 
debt growth in a state and the relative flow of mortgage credit to marginal borrowers. 
 
  Microeconomic data is critical. The aggregate debt to income ratio is a useful measure. 
But the nature of the income process at the aggregate level can lead regulators to discount 
a sharp increase in the debt to income ratio. For example, many regulators argued that 
productivity improvements led to a rise in long-run permanent income that justified 
higher debt levels relative to current income. The microeconomic data show explicitly 
that debt levels are rising in areas where income is not rising. The microeconomic data 
force regulators to understand the reasons why marginal borrowers are building up debt 
without any evidence of an increase in permanent income. 
 
  This methodology applies to other sectors of the economy. I focus here on the 
household sector, but this methodology can be implemented in other sectors easily. For 
example, Greenwood and Hanson (2010) implement a very similar test in the context of 
non-financial businesses. They show that a relative increase in credit to highly levered 
risky companies is followed by lower expected returns on bonds. In fact, they argue that expected returns on bonds are negative after sharp increases in credit to marginal 
borrowers on the corporate side. 
 
  Good Shifts in Credit Supply? More evidence is needed to buttress the assertion that all 
shifts in credit supply end badly. Are there episodes in the past in which a shift in credit 
supply unaccompanied by productivity improvements did not end badly? 
 
  But what about the economics? I am very sympathetic to the complaint that we need to 
understand more about the underlying economics of credit expansion to marginal 
borrowers before implementing the methodology above. For example, under a simple 
model of liquidity constraints, the consumer welfare improvements of credit expansion to 
marginal borrowers are large. But I believe it is equally important to give serious 
considerations to models in which debt amplifies negative shocks (e.g., Bernanke and 
Gertler (1989), Shleifer and Vishny (1992), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Krishnamurthy 
(2003), Allen and Gale (2004)) and models that argue that debt levels can be inefficiently 
high (e.g., Lorenzoni (2008)). Given the ambiguity on the ultimate welfare costs of 
intervention, I have purposely not recommended any specific intervention upon 




In terms of data, one advantage of the methodology is that it can be implemented immediately. In 
fact, most of the data for this exercise is available at the zip code level. Regulators can 
potentially construct a zip code data set to implement this approach going forward without 
requiring any additional surveys or data collection. 
 
In order to construct the ideal data set, I will first list the existing data sources available at the zip 
code level. I will then highlight where more data is needed. 
 
  Home Mortgage Disclosure Act: excellent data on the flow of new mortgages. This is 
available at the individual application level, and can easily be aggregated to the census 
tract or zip code level. The frequency is yearly. 
  Consumer Credit Bureau Data: excellent data on the debt side of the household balance 
sheet. These data could be broken down to the individual level, but are also widely 
available at the zip code level. The frequency is monthly. 
  House Price Data: data on house prices at the zip code level are available from Fiserv 
Case Shiller Weiss, CoreLogic, and Zillow. The frequency is monthly. 
  IRS income data: The IRS Statistics of Income provides income data aggregated to the 
zip code level. The frequency is yearly. 
  Auto sales data: Auto purchases at the zip code-monthly frequency are available from 
R.L. Polk. The frequency is monthly. 
  Census: The decennial census provides a wealth of information at the zip code level. The 
primary drawback is that the information is only provided every 10 years. But this 
snapshot is extremely valuable for understanding the microeconomic patterns behind 
macroeconomic trends. 
 In terms of improvements in data, I would emphasize the following: 
 
  Data on consumption is very limited. The auto sales data is the only measure of 
consumption that I know of that is at the zip code level data. One obvious source of such 
data would be credit card companies and the clearing houses. They should have data at 
the zip code level. Monitoring consumption levels is crucial for understanding how 
leverage is affecting the economy. 
  Data on wealth is also very limited. The most commonly used source is the Survey of 
Consumer Finances. The drawback is that geographic identifiers are not widely available, 
and the sample is quite small. One possible source is IXI Corporation, which may have 
micro data available on the wealth distribution. 
  The IRS data has a huge lag. If the IRS made their zip code level data available much 
more quickly, that would facilitate measurement. As of August 2011, the zip code level 
IRS data is available for 2007 at the latest. 
  While zip code level data is very useful for understanding what is happening in the 
economy, individual level data is needed in some circumstances. One of the most 
important individual level characteristics that is needed is whether someone owns a home 
or not. Being able to split homeowners and renters and examine their patterns separately 
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